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INTRODUCTION

The National Association of Accountants 1 recently conducted a
study of software accounting policy. As a result of interviews con
ducted with executives of software manufacturing companies, it be
came apparent that there was concern that the inability to reflect
software expenditures on the balance sheet adversely affected the abil
ity to raise debt or equity capital. This view was confirmed when it
questionnaire was mailed to software company executives.
In order to test the views of bankers and financial analysts, two
different questionnaires, employing two different research methodolo
gies, were mailed to two groups of commercial lending officers. A
third questionnaire was mailed to financial analysts. Response to the
two commercial lending officer surveys revealed the software compa
nies that capitalize some software expenditures find it less difficult to
obtain bank financing than do companies that expense all software
costs. Responses to the financial analysts' survey revealed that some
analysts prefer software companies that capitalize certain software ex
penditures. Others prefer companies that expense all software costs.
II.

PRIOR STUDIES OF THE EFFECT OF CERTAIN ACCOUNTING
POLICIES ON BANK LENDING DECISIONS AND
STOCK PRICE

During the course of these interviews, several subjects expressed
the view that the inability to place software costs on the balance sheet
would adversely affect a software firm's ability to raise capital. This
feeling was reinforced by the responses received from software vendor
companies. In that questionnaire, 48.5 percent of privately held
software companies and 30.2 percent of the public companies surveyed
agreed that the inability to include software costs on the balance sheet
adversely affects the ability to raise capital.
The view that accounting policy affects a company's stock price
or the ability to raise debt capital has previously been expressed. In
1965, J. L. O'DonnelP examined the price earnings ratio trend of 37
1. The National Association of Accountants is the second largest accounting mem
bership organization in the world (the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
is the largest). It recently moved its world-wide headquarters from New York City to 10
Paragon Drive, Montvale, New Jersey 07645. It has nearly 400 local chapters and sponsors
a variety of educational activities, including conferences and seminars. It also funds and
publishes research and publishes MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING, a monthly referred journal
with a circulation of 97,000.
2. O'Donnell, Relationship Between Reported Earnings and Stock Prices in the Elec
tric Utility Industry, THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW, January 1965 at 135.
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public utilities for the period 1949 through 1961. He determined that
accounting policy can affect stock price. His second study3 produced
the same result. On the other hand, Edward L. Summers4 studied the
effect of investment tax credit, interperiod tax allocation, and funds
flow statements of stock prices in the airline industry. He found no
statistically significant impact. George J. Staubus,S in studying the as
sociation between several accounting variables and stock price, con
cluded that investors found income before depreciation to be more
useful than income after depreciation.
An experimental study conducted by R. E. Jensen 6 concluded
that variations in depreciation and inventory accounting policies af
fected the opinions of analysts. W. J. Bums, Jr.,1 concluded that in
ventory policy does not affect pricing, advertising, and production
decisions. The three studies, conducted by T. R. Dyckman, 8 reached
conflicting results. His first study concluded that variations in inven
tory methods can influence financial statement readers, a conclusion
that is diametrically opposed to that reached by Bums. Dyckman's
second study9 concluded that inventory method does not influence de
cision-making. His third study,lO however, reached the opposite con
clusion. Dopuch and Ronen,11 using students for financial statement
readers, concluded that inventory policy does influence readers of fi
nancial statements. Mlynarczyk's study12 compared the flow-through
and deferred method of tax accounting. He reached the same conclu
sion. Falk and Ophirl3 found that investors react both to the content
3. O'Donnell, Further Observation on Reported Earnings and Stock Prices, THE Ac
COUNTING REVIEW, July 1968 at 549.
4. Summers, Observation ofEffects of Using Alternative Reporting Practices, THE Ac
COUNTING REVIEW, April 1968 at 257.
5. Staubus, The Association of Financial Accounting Variables with Common Stock
Values, THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW, January 1965 at 119.
6. Jensen, An Experimental Design for Study of Effects of Accounting Variations in
Decision Making, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Autumn 1966 at 224.
7. Bruns, Inventory Valuation and Management Decisions, THE ACCOUNTING RE
VIEW, April 1965 at 345.
8. Dyckman, On the Investment Decisions, THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW, April 1964
at 285.
9. Dyckman, The Effects ofAlternative Accounting Techniques on Certain Manage
ment Decisions, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Spring 1964 at 91.
10. Dyckman, On the Effects ofEarnings-Trends. Size and Inventory Valuation Pr0
cedures in Evaluating a Business Firm, RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING MEASUREMENT 175
185 (Jaedicke, et. al. eds. 1966).
11. Dopuch & Ronen, The Effects ofAlternative Inventory Valuation Methods, JOUR
NAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Autumn 1973 at 191.
12. Mlynarczyk, An Empirical Study of Accounting Methods and Stock Prices, EM
PIRICAL RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING: SELECTED STUDIES, 1969 at 63.
13. Falk & Ophir, The Influence ofDifferences in Accounting Policies on Investment
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and form of disclosure.
There have been at least three major studies dealing with the ef
fect of accounting policies on bank lending decisions. In 1970, T. N.
Jain conducted a study14 of the effects of tax accounting methods on
bank lending decisions. In that study, financial data for two compa
nies were sent to 110 lending officers at large banks. The high re
sponse rate of 67 percent (74 responses) was due, in part, to the fact
that most of the bankers were also contacted personally, and a follow
up letter was sent to the remainder. The financial data for the two
companies was identical in all respects, except for the method of ac
counting for income taxes. One company used comprehensive alloca
tion and one used partial allocation. The study found that the method
of accounting for income taxes does influence lending decisions.
The second studylS was conducted by A. A. EI-Arabi in 1977. In
this study, two sets of financial statements were prepared for two hy
pothetical firms. The data for both sets of financial statements were
identical except for the accounting principles used. One set used the
FIFO method of inventory valuation and the straight-line depreciation
method. The second used LIFO and the sum of the years digits
method. The sample consisted of two groups of banks. Group one,
consisting of 332 banks (of which 37 percent responded), was sent the
FIFO/straight-line data. Group two, consisting of 331 banks (of
which 32 percent responded), was sent the LIFO/sum of the years
digits data. The study found that the accounting principles used did
affect the lending decision.
The third study was conducted by M. M. EI-Maksy.16 In this
study, 1,050 loan officers from 240 banks were divided into seven
groups. Responses were received from 267 lenders representing 143
banks. The first group received financial data containing no F ASB
No. 33 information. Each of the treatment groups received one piece
of FASB No. 33 data (either constant dollar, current cost, or both)
which was either presented in the notes to the financial statements or
Decisions," JOURNALS OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Spring 1973 at 108. See also Falk,

"Use of Financial Statements for Investment Decision Making in Israel's Companies,"
Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University (1971).
14. Jain, "A Study of the Effects of Alternative Methods of Accounting for Income
Taxes on Term Loan Decisions," Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University (1970).
15. EI-Arabi, "The Effects of Accounting Alternatives on Lending Decisions of
Commercial Bankers," Ph.D. dissertation, the Louisiana State University and Agricultural
and Mechanical College (1977).
16. El-Maksy, "A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effects of FASB
Statement No. 33 on Lending Decisions," Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York
(1983).
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on the face of the income statement and notes. The study found that
lending decisions for the control group were not significantly different
statistically from that of the treatment groups, although lending deci
sions for the treatment groups were less favorable than those for the
control groups in 94 percent of the cases. The groups receiving con
stant dollar data made lending decisions that were not significantly
different statistically from those decisions made by lenders who re
ceived current cost data.
III.
A.

RESULTS OF THE FIRST CoMMERCIAL LENDING
OFFICER SURVEY

Background

In a prior study,11 telephone interviews were conducted with
more than twenty individuals representing several facets of the
software industry. Eighteen individuals representing seven software
manufacturers and internal users were personally interviewed on com
pany premises. A questionnaire survey was also mailed to executives
of software manufacturing companies. Information obtained from the
interviews and mail survey revealed that a significant number of
software company executives were of the opinion that the inability to
reflect software expenditures on the balance sheet adversely affected
their ability to raise debt or equity capital.
To test the validity of this view, two separate surveys employing
different research methodologies were constructed and were mailed to
different groups of commercial lending officers. A third survey was
mailed to financial analysts.

B.

The First Commercial Lending Officer Survey

Two questi~nnaires and related financial data were mailed to two
separate groups of commercial lending officers,18 chosen from banks
with assets in excess of $500 million. Data for Campbell Corporation,
a company that capitalizes software costs with net income of
$2,552,107, $2,213,154, and $903,131 for 1982, 1981, and 1980, re
spectively, was sent to 174 commercial lending officers. Campbell
17. R. McGee, ACCOUNTING FOR SOfTWARE COSTS (1984).
18. A similar methodology was employed by EI-Arabi in "The Effects of Accounting
Alternatives on Lending Decisions of Commercial Bankers," Ph.D. dissertation, the Loui
siana State University and Agricultural College (1977). See also EI-Maksy, "A Theoretical
and Empirical Investigation of the Effects of FASB Statement No. 33 on Lending Deci
sions," Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York (1983), where a slightly different
methodology was employed.
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Corporation is a real, publicly held software company. The financial
data sent was authentic. Only the company name was changed.
Data for Edwards Corporation was sent to 174 other commercial
lending officers. The only difference between Edwards and Campbell
was that Edwards expenses all software costs. Edwards had a
$2,103,000 net loss in 1982 and net income of $498,000 and $301,000
in 1981 and 1980, respectively.
Twenty responses were received for Campbell and thirty for Ed
wards. Responses to the individual questions are summarized below.
QUESTION ONE:

How large a line of credit would your bank be willing to grant to this
Company?
TABLE ONE

Campbell Corporation
Number of
Responses

Total

S
1
1
1
2
3
1
1
2
2
1
20

-

Amount
$

-0
7S0K-IM
1M
I-2M
2m
3M
3.SM
4.SM
SM
7M
7.SM

Edwards Corporation
Number of
Responses
17
1
1

1
1

6
1

1
1

Amount
$

-0

1M
3-6M
4M
4.SM
SM
6M
lOM
lO-ISM

30

Table One summarizes the responses. Twenty-five percent of the
commercial lending officers responding to the Campbell questionnaire
would not grant a line of credit, compared to 57 percent of those re
sponding to Edwards. For those who would grant a line of credit, the
amounts ranged as high as $7.5 million for Campbell and $15 million
for Edwards. A test of variability determined that the responses re
ceived from the two groups was not statistically different at the 10
percent level, even though the reject rate for Edwards (57 percent) was
more than twice that for Campbell (25 percent). Perhaps this result is
due to the low response rate and high degree of variability.
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Two:

Ifyour bank would not approve a line of credit for this company,
please indicate why the application would be denied.
The banks denying Campbell's application responded as follows:
1. Too many questions raised in financial statements, i.e.,
purpose of line (to replace other bank?), carry receivables, carry
proprietary software costs? We also question the quality of the fi
nancial statements: there is no cash/funds flow, no reconcilement
of net worth, no amortization of property and equipment on the
income statement, capitalized leases do not appear to be on the bal
ance sheet and write-off of computer costs (in 4-6 years) does not
appear to be taking place on P & L.
2. All needs appear to be permanent financing. It is impossi
ble to determine if a line can be repaid by the liquidation of short
term assets.
3. Concerns: leverage, vulnerability of main product line in
competitive environment; bulk of assets (computers and software)
could become obsolete rapidly.
4. The application would be denied until further information
concerning the following could be obtained: an accounts receivable
aging, projections indicating future profitability, capital expendi
tures, and the direction of the company. This would include pro
jected income statements and balance sheets. We would also need a
recent interim statement and a sources and uses of funds statement
dated December 31, 1982.
5. Interest expense on bonds will be 11 percent of $20 million,
or $2.2 million, which wo.uld entirely deplete earnings based on
1982 figures.

The banks denying Edward's application responded as follows:
Prior to my bank venturing a decision regarding this
company's ability to receive from us a line of credit and/or a term
loan, more in-depth analysis would need to be made. Certainly, we
would wish to view pro forma balance sheets (five years) and in
come statements (five years). The pro formas would aid us in ob
taining some insight into the company's future financial needs and
management objectives.
The tremendous sales growth that the company has enjoyed
during the past five years has certainly been a contributing force in
the company's need for external funds. The pro formas that the
bank would require would aid us in determining how much of the
external funds would be needed to support the increased receivables
1.
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and inventory (short term), and how much external funds would be
needed to support the increase in fixed assets (long term).
If the company's projections reveal a continuation of the rapid
sales growth, we could conclude that repayment of a portion of the
external funds would not be repaid until the rate of sales growth
declines. Of course, those funds that will support the receivables
and inventory will be considered to be self-liquidating.
We would request a break out of the G & A expenses so as to
better calculate the company's G & A trends. Depreciation expense
is needed to better analyze the company's cash flow and to calculate
more revealing ratios.
The company's sales growth and interest expenses were very
important in the decline of profitability for the Edwards Corpora
tion. Next year, the servicing of the debenture, interest and sinking
fund will add additional strain to profitability.
2. There is a significant increase in long term subordinated
convertible debt with sinking fund requirements of $1.5 million.
Long term debt should provide a sufficient operating fund for the
near term. There is no explanation for the loss other than increased
cost of goods sold.
3. The company is not generating sufficient cash to support
its current financing costs.
4. (a) Nature of business; (b) operating deficiencies; (c) risk
of upcoming year; (d) uncertain nature of accounts receivable, oper
ating expenses, payable and subordination convertible debentures;
(e) increasing international business.
5. In general, we do not make loans without first hand
knowledge and assessment of management. In particular, it is not
clear what the purpose of the line would be given their present
abundance of cash resources.
6. (a) Severe operating loss due to excessive increases in ex
penses; (b) insufficient financial data regarding expenses; (c) heavy
current and long-term credit obligations; (d) no knowledge of man
agement and its ability; (e) no interim financial data for any portion
of 1983.
7. (a) Revenue recognition methods; (b) product.is subject
to obsolescence without warning.
8. (a) The investment in the building is too much for the
company to carry (interest plus depreciation); (b) the three year life
on computers used until 1981 was too long and the company has
not shown an operating profit since the change.
9. (a) Insufficient information; (b) source and application of
funds statement for 1982 was not given; (c) value or potential future
income in program library being developed, market penetration and
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permanence for one to five years; (d) this company is highly lever
aged, and if present liquidity is used, there will be no place to go
except lender financial losses with no valuable assets to liquidate.
10. The company is unable to generate operating profit. Cash
flow is inadequate. Speculation is company having to discount be
low costs to meet competition.
11. (a) Downward trend in savings; (b) no clear source of re
payment; (c) no evident secondary source of repayment; (d) a $6
million revolver is already in place.
12. There is a question as to the quality of receivables. An
aging schedule would be helpful. The line of business makes the
company a high risk venture.
13. The company is insolvent based on the times interest
earned ratio. It is also highly leveraged. Declining profitability and
insufficient cash flow add to this credit risk. The company also has
future debt obligations that would further deter their ability to ser
vice their debt.
14. (a) Volatile industry; (b) weak operating earnings;
(c) excessive fixed asset expansion for a company that does not have
excess cash to allocate to fixed assets and the nature of which does
not require ownership of land and buildings. The company can op
erate from leased facilities; (d) the company incurred operating
losses that will be compounded by the interest expense on the addi
tional debt; (e) evidence of unsound judgment on the part of
management.
15. (a) Existing $6 million line of credit; (b) deteriorating
profits; (c) receivables collection.
16. Account receivable turnover is slow (over 100 days).
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With an operating loss experienced in 1982, the company could be
running into a situation of evergreen credit.
QUESTION THREE:

What rate of interest would you charge?
TABLE Two

Cam:ebell Corporation
Number of
Responses

Totals

5
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
20

Rate
N/A
11.00
11.25
11.58
12.00
12.22
12.50
12.78
13.00
13.06
13.16
13.33
13.53
13.75

Edwards Coryoration
Number of
Res:eonses
16
1

4
1
1
1
1

4
1

Rate
N/A
11.00
12.00
12.63
12.75
12.78
13.16
13.33
15.00

30

-

Table Two summarizes the response to this question. 19 Interest
rates have been adjusted in order to account for compensating bal
ances. A test of variability revealed that there was not a significant
different (at the 10 percent level) between the rate charged to Camp
bell and that charged to Edwards. This finding concurs with that
found in the Jain study.20
QUESTION FOUR:

What additional terms would you impose?
19. The interest rate provided was adjusted to take into account any compensating
balance that would be required. The prime rate was 11 percent at the time the question
naire was mailed. The rate did not change until after all responses had been received.
20. Jain, supra note 14, at 271. Jain also found no difference between groups for
compensating balances, minimum working capital, maximum additional debt, maximum
dividends or maximum officers salaries. Id.
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The response to this question varied widely, but included the fol
lowing terms:
1. compensating balance ranging from 5-15 percent, and/or a
commitment fee ranging from 1/8 percent to 1/2 percent;
2. credit line granted up to 60-75 percent of accounts receiva
ble. Procure a monthly account receivable aging schedule;
3. loan secured by inventory or other assets, security agree
ment on property, equipment and/or receivables;
4. quarterly financial data with 90 day review;
5. convert line to term loan with 3-5 year payout;
6. annual cleanup with zero balance for 30-60 days;
7. restrictions on capital expenditures, lease obligations,
working capital, dividends, additional debt, bonuses, officers' sala
ries, and changes in ownership; and
8. require owner guarantee, approval of subordinated debt
holders, and key insurance.
QUESTION FIVE:

If, instead of a line of credit, the company had applied for a
$2,000,000, five year loan, would your bank grant the loan?
TABLE THREE

Campbell Corporation
Number of
Responses
Yes
No
Totals

10
10
20

-

Percentage
50%
50%

Edwards Corporation
Number of
Responses
9
21
30

Percentage
30%
70%

Table Three summarizes the responses to this question.
Although a larger percentage of lending officers said they would lend
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to Campbell than to Edwards, the chi-square test indicated that this
difference was not significant at the 10 percent level.
QUESTION SIX:

Do you consider this loan to be extremely risky, risky, marginal, safe,
or extremely safe?
TABLE FOUR

A

Campbell Corporation
Do you consider
this loan to be:

Number of
Responses Percentage

2
4
5

Extremely risky
Risky
Marginal
Safe
Extremely safe

10%
20
25
45
0

9

0
20

Totals

-

Edwards Corporation
Number of
Res~onses

Percentage

7

23%

12

40

9

30

2
0
30

7

0

-

TABLE FOUR

B

Campbell
Corporation

Extremely risky
Risky
Marginal
Safe
Extremely safe

Edwards
Corporation

Points

Number of
Responses

Points

Number of
Responses

Points

5
4
3
2
1

2
4
5
9
0

10
16
15
18
0

7
12
9
2
0

35
48
27
4
0

20

-

59

-

30

-

Weighted Average

2.95
Marginal

3.80
Risky

Median

Marginal

Risky

Mode

Safe

Risky

114

-

Table Four shows that bankers tended to view a loan to Edwards
as more risky than one to Campbell. The chi "square test indicated
that this difference was significant at the 10 percent level.
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QUESTION SEVEN:

If your bank would not approve this term loan, please indicate why
the application would be denied.
The responses to this question were similar to those responses to
question two.
QUESTION EIGHT:

What rate of interest would you charge for the term loan?
TABLE FIVE

CamEbell Corporation
Number of
Responses

Totals

10
1
2
3
1
1
1
1
20

Percentage

Edwards Corporation
Number of
Responses

Percentage

21
2
1
2
1
1
2

N/A
12.00
12.50
13.33
13.68
13.89
15.29

N/A
11.75
12.11
13.33
13.50
13.61
13.89
14.69

30

-

-

Table Five summarizes the responses to this question. 21 The av
erage interest rate charged to Campbell is 13.165 percent, compared to
13.473 percent for Edwards. Although the rate charged Edwards is
somewhat higher than that charged Campbell, the difference is not
significant at the 10 percent level.22
QUESTION NINE:

What compensating balance would be required?
Ten banks suggested a willingness to grant a term loan to Camp
bell. Eight would require a compensating balance, ranging from 5 to
20 percent and averaging 9.7 percent. Of the nine banks that would
21. The interest rate given was adjusted to take into account any compensating bal
ance that would be required. The prime rate was 11 percent at the time the questionnaire
was mailed, and the rate did not change until after all responses had been received.
22. Jain, supra note 14, at 271.
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lend to Edwards, six would require a compensating balance, ranging
from 5 to 15 percent and averaging 10.6 percent.
QUESTION TEN:

What restrictions on working capital WfJuld be imposed?
Of the ten bankers that would lend to Campbell, three would re
quire a. $10 million minimum in working capital. One would require
$5 million. One bank would require that the current level
($10,614,400) be maintained. Others would require a current ratio of
1.5:1 to 2.1:1 or a working capital/asset ratio of 18 percent or a work
ing capital/revenue ratio of 35 percent. One bank would place no re
strictions on working capital. Responses for the Edwards Corporation
were similar. Tables Six and Seven provide a more detailed break
down of the responses for both companies.
QUESTION ELEVEN:

How much additional debt would the company be allowed to incur?
Five of the ten Campbell responses would not allow additional
long-term debt without bank approval. Two banks would allow an
additional $1 million. One bank would allow an additional $5 million.
Two banks would require a debt/worth ratio of 2.0: 1.
Of the nine Edwards responses, six would not permit additional
debt. One bank would not place a restriction on additional debt. An
other would allow $2.5. million for each of the next five years. One
would require a 3.0: 1 debt/worth ratio.
QUESTION TWELVE:

What is the maximum annual dividend that could be paid?
Four of the ten Campbell responses would not permit any divi
dends. One bank would impose no restrictions on dividends. Other
respondents would allow dividends ranging from 10 to 50 percent of
net income or cash flow.
Four of the nine Edwards responses would not permit dividends.
Two others would permit dividends up to 25 percent of earnings. One
would require a debt/worth ratio 2.5:1.
QUESTION THIRTEEN:

What additional terms would you impose?
Most bankers would impose additional terms for both Campbell
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and Edwards. The additional terms are summarized in Tables Six and
Seven.
TABLE SIX

Banks Approving a Term Loan for Campbell Corporation
Summary of Restrictions·
Bank
No.

Question 10
Working Capital

Question II
Additional Debt

Question 12
Maximum Annual Dividend

Question 13
Additional Terms

$5 million

None

Term loan agreement
with usual covenants.

2 $10 million
minimum

No long term debt
of more than $1
million without
bank approval

No response

Liability to stockholders
equity ratio not more
than 1.8:1; No capital
expenditures in excess of
$1 million or purchase of
treasury stock without
bank approval

3 $10 million
minimum

None without
permission,
including additional
leases

None without permission

Negative pledge on assets,
no change in
management, limit capital
expenditures and lease
commitments

4 Not to go below
current levels
($1O.6M)

None without bank
approval

None without bank approval

Net worth and liquidity
tests

10% of net profit after taxes

Secured by fixed assets

$5 million
minimum

5 Working capital as Debt to worth ratio
should not exceed
a percentage of
2.0 in 1983, 1.8 in
assets should be
1984, 1.7 in 1985
maintained at
and should continue
18%
to improve over the
5 year period
6 Current ratio
1.5: I, working
capital 35% of
revenues

Debt to worth not
10% of net cash flow from
to exceed 2.0: I, no
operations after long-term
additional long-term debt service
debt without
approval

7 $10 million
minimum

Up to $1 million
more, depending on
use and need

None

No dividends or outside
debt financing without
prior approval. Not to be
used for working capital

8 Maintain current
ratio (2.2: I)

None

30% net after tax

None stated

9 No restriction

Depends on purpose No restrictions
and ratio trends

10 Minimum current
ratio 2.0:1

None

50% of net income

No net increase to fixed
assets; courseware

construction costs net
balance maintained at
45% (or less) of annual
dollar sales rate; quarterly
financials

Should be secured,
guaranty of 20%
stockholders, loan
agreement, key insurance
if necessary
None stated

TABLE SEVEN

Banks Approving a Term Loan for Edwards Corporation

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

720

[Vol. 7:705

Summary of Restrictions
Bank
No.

Question 10
Working Capital

Question II
Additional Debt

Question 12
Maximum Annual Dividend

Question 13
Additional Terms

None

None

Security agreements on
property and equipment,
accounts receivable; $2
million guarantee of
payment

2 Minimum current
ratio of 2: I and
working capital
minimum 510
mi1Iion

None without
approval

None

Profitability within a
predetermined time
frame; actual performance
tracking closely to
projected, maximum
leverage; negative pledge
on assets; no other debt;
dividends; no treasury
stock purchases; no asset
dispositions or mergers or
acquisition unless prior
approval given;

3 1.2 current ratio,
58 mi1Iion
minimum

None

One year after profitable
operations, 25% of after-tax
earnings

Limit capital
expenditures; leverage
covenants-step up over
course of loan; earnings
recapture;

4 57 mi1Iion
minimum

No other senior debt None, without prior bank
approval
or capital leases
without prior bank
approval

5 Maintain 1.75:1
current ratio

None without bank
approval

6 57 mi1Iion
minimum

No restriction stated No restriction stated

At the end of 2 years, if
the company has not
returned to profitable
operations, the bank
would reserve the right to
restructure debt
repayment

7 1.75: I current
ratio 55 mi1Iion
minimum

52.5 million each
25% of earnings
year for next 5 years

Maximum debt/worth
ratio of 2.00: I

8 Secured by fixed
assets with an
80% advance

Must maintain debt/ Allowed if debt/worth ratio
worth ratio of 3.00: I remains 2.5: I or below

None stated

9 1.75: I current
ratio 57.5 mi1Iion
minimum

No additional debt
without bank
approval other than
normal trade
payables

Security agreements on
accounts receivables, all
machinery, equipment,
furniture, fixtures, 2nd
lien on all previously
encumbered fixed assets;
restrictive covenants on
capital accounts

Required quick
ratio 1.75: I,
current ratio
2.00:1

Dependent on earnings and
cash flow

None

Net worth floor of 511
million; no capital
expenditures above a
certain amount without
approval; security,
possibly, if no good
evidence of turnaround
No borrowings from
other sources; no
pledging of any assets;
minimum working capital
ratio; maximum debt/
worth ratio; quarterly
financial statements
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QUESTION FOURTEEN:

The bank's total assets are:

More than $5 billion
$5 billion or less

Campbell

Edwards

5
15

4

20

-

26
30

-

A correlation between bank size and other questionnaire re
sponses was not made due to the small sample size. 23
QUESTION FIFfEEN:

The person completing this questionnaire has had-years experience
in a loan department.
Campbell

Edwards

9

9

0

3

Two or less
More than two, less
than five
Five to ten
More than ten
No response

8

11

2

6

1

1

20

-

30

-

A correlation between years of loan experience and other ques

23. The EI-Arabi study found that bank size was not a significant factor in the lend
ing decision. See supra note 15.
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tionnaire responses was not made due to the small sample size. 24
QUESTION SIXTEEN:

The position of the person completing this questionnaire is:
Campbell

Edwards

Senior or executive vice
president or other
senior officer

0

4

Vice president, secretary
or treasurer

5

11

12
3
20

13

Assistant vice president or
other assistant officer
Not an officer

-

2
30

-

A correlation between title and other questionnaire responses was
not made due to the small sample size. 25
QUESTION SEVENTEEN:

The office where this questionnaire is being completed is located in
the:
Campbell
Northeast
South
North Central
West
No response

Edwards

1

8

10
6

9

2
1
20

4

-

8

1
30

-

A correlation between geographic location and other question
naire responses was not made due to the small sample size. 26
24. The El-Maksy and El-Arabi studies concluded that the experience is not a signifi
cant factor in the loan decision making process. See supra notes IS and 16.
25. The EI-Arabi study found that rank was a significant factor in the lending deci
sion. See supra note IS. El-Maksy found, however, that sex and membership in a banking
association were not significant factors. See supra note 16.
26. The El-Arabi and El-Maksy studies both concluded that the bank's geographic
location is not a significant factor in the lending decision. El-Maksy also found that the
amount of time spent responding to the questionnaire was insignificant. See supra notes IS
and 16.
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C. Summary and Conclusions

Companies that do not capitalize software costs find it more diffi
cult to raise debt capital than companies that do capitalize such costs.
This fact was brought to the author's attention during the course of
the interviews with executives from software vending companies. It
was reinforced by the responses received on the software vendor ques
tionnaire, which revealed that a substantial proportion of software
vendor company executives feel that not capitalizing software costs
hinders their ability to raise debt capital. Furthermore, the response
to question six of the banker questionnaire indicated that bank lending
officers view a loan to a company that expenses software costs as more
risky than a loan to a company that capitalizes software costs.
Although insignificant at the ten percent level, some of the re
sponses to the other questions in the banker questionnaire lead in the
same direction. Seventeen of thirty (57%) lending officers would not
grant a line of credit to Edwards, compared to five out of twenty
(25%) for Campbell. Question two revealed that one of the main rea
sons for the loan officer's reluctance to lend was the weak operating
performance of Edwards. Several banks mentioned that performance
as a reason for not lending to Edwards. None of the bankers that
received the Campbell questionnaire gave poor operating performance
as a reason for not granting a line of credit to Campbell. Campbell
showed 1982 net income of $2,552,107, due to its software accounting
policy, compared to a 1982 loss of $2,103,000 for Edwards.
For those banks that would lend to Campbell or Edwards, the
rate of interest charged, although not significant at the ten percent
level, is higher for Edwards than for Campbell.
CamEbell

Edwards

Q-3

Interest rate charged for
a line of credit

12.566%

12.760%

Q-8

Interest rate charged for
a term loan

13.165

13.473

When asked whether the bank would grant a $2 million term
loan, half of the Campbell bankers responded in the affirmative com
pared to 30 percent for Edwards.
The interviews and questionnaire responses point to one conclu
sion. A company that capitalizes software costs will find it easier to
raise debt capital than will a company that expenses these costs.
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REsULTS OF THE SECOND COMMERCIAL LENDING OFFICER
SURVEY

A.

Methodology

The sample for this survey consisted of 1,002 commercial lending
officers, obtained randomly from a population of 5,700. The list was
purchased from a company that sells mailing lists. Five data packets
were returned as undeliverable. Forty-five usable responses were re
ceived. The response ratio was 4.5 percent. The material sent to com
mercial lending officers inc1uded27 a cover letter, questionnaire,
postpaid return envelope, modified annual reports for both Campbell
Corporation and Edwards Corporation, an accounts receivable aging
schedule for both companies, and a listing of certain key financial ra
tios 28 for both companies.
B.

Findings

The responses can be subdivided into four distinct categories. Of
the forty-five usable responses received, twenty-eight (62.2%) favored
Campbell Corporation over Edwards Corporation. 29 Five responses
(11.1 %) favored Edwards. Six responses (13.3%) indicated they
would treat the companies equally, but did not give any reason for
similar treatment. Six responses (13.3%) indicated they would treat
the companies equally, because a company's software accounting pol
icy would not influence their lending decision. 30 These subdivisions

27. Jain, supra note 14.
28. The ratios chosen for inclusion in this list were selected partially based on a study
that listed the ratios most frequently used by lending officers. See EI-Maksy, "A Theoreti
cal and Empirical Investigation of the Effects of FASB Statement No. 33 on Lending Deci·
sion," Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York at 74-76 (1983).
29. Campbell Corporation capitalized certain software expenditures. Edwards Cor
poration expensed all software costs.
30. One of the deficiencies of using the research methodology employed in this sur
vey is that some bankers may state that their decision· to lend or not to lend is not infiu
enced by a company's accounting policy, whereas their actual lending decisions may be so
influenced. This deficiency can be avoided by sending different data to two different groups
of bankers, as was done in the first survey. This approach may also be criticized, however,
because the samples surveyed are different. Such criticism may be overcome by sending
data for both companies to the same sample, as was done in the second survey.
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are summarized in Table Eight.
TABLE EIGHT

Bankers Favoring Campbell and Edwards

Number of
Reseonses

Percentage

28
5

62.2%
11.1

Bankers favoring Campbell
Bankers favoring Edwards
Campbell and Edwards treated
equally-no reason given
Campbell and Edwards treated
equally because accounting
policy should not affect the
lending decision
Total responses

6

13.3

6

13.3

45

QUESTION ONE:

Question one asked whether the bank would grant a $3 million,
five year unsecured loan to Campbell and Edwards. The responses
revealed that 27 bankers (61.4%) would grant the loan to Campbell,
but only 12 bankers (27.3%) would do so for Edwards. Seventeen of
forty-five bankers responding to this question (38.6%) would not grant
the loan to Campbell, compared to nearly three out of four (72.7%)
who would deny a loan request by Edwards.
TABLE NINE

Camebell
Number of
Responses
Percentage
Yes
No

27
17
44

-

Edwards

61.4%
38.6
100.0%
QUESTION

Number of
Responses

Percentage

12
32
44

27.3%
72.7
100.0%

-

-

Two:

This question asked what interest rate would be charged. Of the
20 lending officers that gave a rate for both Campbell and Edwards,
eleven (55%) would charge Campbell a lower rate, one (5%) would
charge Edwards a lower rate, and eight (40%) would charge both
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companies the same rate. Rates given varied from prime to prime plus
four percent. Rates charged Edwards were generally higher than
those charged Campbell. The weighted average rate for Campbell was
prime plus 1.2%, compared with prime rate plus 1.9% for Edwards.
The median rates for Campbell and Edwards were prime plus 1.0%
and prime plus 1.75%, respectively. The mode for each company was
prime plus 1%.
TABLE TEN

A

Number of
Responses
Lower rate for Campbell
Lower rate for Edwards
Same rate for both

Percentage

11
1

55%
5
40
100

8
20
TABLE TEN

B
Edwards

Campbell
Rate Charged
Prime Plus

Number of
Responses

Percentage

0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0

1
9
10
2
8
1
1

3.1%
28.1
31.3
6.2
25.0
3.1
3.1

Percentage

3
5
3
4
3

-%
13.6
22.7
13.6
18.2
13.6

1
3
22

32

Weighted
Average Rate
Median Rate
Mode

Number of
Responses

4.5
13.6

-

-

Prime plus 1.2%
Prime plus 1.0%
Prime plus 1.0%

Prime plus 1.9%
Prime plus 1.75%
Prime plus 1.0%

QUESTION THREE:

Question three asked, "How would you rate this loan for each
corporation?" Responses indicated that a loan to Campbell Corpora
tion was generally regarded as safer than a loan to Edwards Corpora

1985]

SOFTWARE ACCOUNTING

727

tion. Only one banker (2.3%) rated a loan to Campbell as being
extremely risky, compared with thirteen bankers (31.7%) who classi
fied the Edwards loan as extremely risky. Twelve bankers (27.9%)
rated a loan to Campbell as risky, compared with sixteen (39.0%) for
Edwards. A loan to Campbell was considered marginal by thirteen
. bankers (30.2%), compared with ten (24.4%) for Edwards. A Camp
bell loan was considered safe by seventeen bankers (39.5%), compared
with two bankers (4.9%) who viewed an Edwards loan as safe. No
bankers rated either Campbell or Edwards as extremely safe. The av
erage response indicated that a loan to Campbell would be considered
marginal, whereas a loan to Edwards would be considered risky.
TABLE ELEVEN

A

Cam~bell

Extremely risky
Risky
Marginal
Safe
Extremely safe
Totals

Edwards

Number of
Responses

Percentage

Number of
Responses

Percentage

1
12
13
17
0

2.3%
27.9
30.2
39.5
0.0

13
16
10
2
0

31.7%
39.0
24.4
4.9
0.0

43

41

-

-

TABLE ELEVEN

B

Cam~bell

Extremely risky
Risky
Marginal
Safe
Extremely safe

Edwards

Points

Number of
Responses

Points

5
4
3
2
1

1
12
13
17
0

5
48
39
34
0

13
16
10
2
0

43

126

41

Number of

-

-

Res~onses

-

Weighted Average

2.93
Marginal

3.98
Risky

Median

Marginal

Risky

Mode

Safe

Risky

Points

-

65
64
30
4
0

163

-
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QUESTION FOUR:

This question asked, "On a scale of 0% to 100%, what are the
chances that the corporation will default on the loan, if made?" Of the
41 bankers responding to this question for both Campbell and Ed
wards, twenty-four (58.5%) rated Campbell as the better risk, six
bankers (14.6%) rated Edwards as safer, and eleven bankers (26.8%)
rated the corporations as equal risks.
Of the forty bankers giving percentages (one respondent answered
"same"), Campbell was given a 23.5% chance of default, compared
with 46.2% for Edwards. The median chance of default was 15% for
Campbell and 50% for Edwards. The mode for 5% for each
company.
TABLE TWELVE

A

Number of
Responses

Percentage

Lower percentage chance of
default for Campbell

24

58.5%

Lower percentage chance of
default for Edwards

6

14.6

11

26.8

Same chance of default for
Campbell and Edwards

41
TABLE TWELVE

B
Edwards

CamEbell
Percentage
Chance of Default

o11 -

21
31
41
51
61
71
81
91

-

10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

Number of
ResEonses
19
4
6
3
2
1
3
0
0
2
40

-

Percentage
47.5%
10.0
15.0
7.5
5.0
2.5
7.5

5.0
100.0%

-

Number of
Responses
10
3
2
3
2
4
6
5
3
40

-

Percentage
25.0%
7.5
5.0
7.5
5.0
10.0
5.0
15.0
12.5
7.5
100.0

-
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TABLE TWELVE

C
Edwards

CamEbell
Approximate Percentage
Chance of Default

Number of
ResEonses

Points

5
15
25
35
45
55
65
75
85
95

19
4
6
3
2
1
3
0
0
2
40

95
60
150
105
90
55
195
0
0
190
940

Weighted Average
Chance of Default
Median Chance of Default
Mode Chance of Default

729

23.5%
15%
5%

Number of
ResEonses

10
3
2
3
2
4
2
6
5
3
40
-

Points

50
45
50
105
90
220
130
450
425
285
1,850
46.2%
50%
5%

QUESTION FIVE:

This question attempted to determine whether additional terms,
such as restrictions on working capital, further debt, dividends, and
officers' salaries, would be more restrictive for one of the companies.
Of the 43 commercial lending officers responding to this question,
three (7.0%) would have more restrictive terms for Campbell, twenty
(46.5%) would have more restrictive terms for Edwards, and twenty
(46.5%) would have equally restrictrive terms.
TABLE THIRTEEN

More restrictive for Campbell
than for Edwards
Less restrictive for Campbell
than for Edwards
Equally restrictive

Number of
ResEonses

Percentage

3

7.0%

20
20
43

46.5
46.5

730
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QUESTION SIX:

This question gave the following proposition: "For purposes of
this question only, assume that your bank had only $5 million avail
able to lend. How much would be lent to Campbell? Edwards?"
Twenty-four ofthe 38 bankers that responded to this question (63.2%)
indicated they would lend more to Campbell. Four bankers (10.5%)
would lend more to Edwards. Ten bankers (26.3%) would lend equal
amounts to both companies.
TABLE FOURTEEN

Bankers who would lend more
to Campbell
Bankers who would lend more
to Edwards
Bankers who would lend the
same amount to both companies

Number of
Responses

Percentage

24

63.2%

4

10.5

10

26.3
100.0

38
QUESTION SEVEN:

This question asked, "If, instead of a term loan, Campbell and
Edwards each applied for an unsecured line of credit, what is the max
imum line your bank would be willing to grant to Campbell? Ed
wards?" Of the 37 lending officers responding to this question, twenty
(54.1 %) would grant a larger line to Campbell, two (5.4%) would
grant a larger line to Edwards, and fifteen (40.5%) would grant an
equal line to both companies.
Fifteen bankers (40.5%) would grant a line of credit to both com
panies. Thirteen (35.1 %) would grant a line of credit to Campbell but
not to Edwards. None of the bankers would grant a line to Edwards
but not Campbell. Nine respondents (24.3%) would not grant a credit
line to either company.
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TABLE FIFTEEN A

Number of
Responses

Percentage

20

54.1%

2

5.4

-15

-40.5
100.0
--

Bankers who would grant a
larger line to Campbell
Bankers who would grant a
larger line to Edwards
Bankers who would grant the
same line of credit to Campbell
and Edwards

37
-

TABLE FIFTEEN

B

Number of
Responses

Percentage

15

40.5%

13

35.1

0

0

Bankers granting a line of credit
to both Campbell and Edwards
Bankers granting a line of credit
to Campbell but not to Edwards
Bankers granting a line of credit
to Edwards but not to Campbell
Bankers not granting a line of
credit either to Campbell or
Edwards

9

24.3

37

QUESTION EIGHT:

This question was stated as follows: "If your bank. would treat
applications by Campbell and Edwards differently, please indicate the
reasons for the different treatments. Feel free to use more space if
needed."
Banks favoring Campbell Corporation cited the following
reasons:
1.

Campbell obviously has much better control of operating costs
and has taken steps to position itself for the future.

2.

Edwards' ratios in debt to worth are disturbing and his situa
tion is deteriorating by the years indicated. The Edwards situ
ation should indicate additional caution.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

732

[Vol. 7:705

3.

Both loans are marginal and should not be made.

4.

I would work toward securing both credits. Edwards would
have to be secured in order to extend the credit; however, with
negative cash flow it still would be a questionable credit.

5.

The Edwards statement would need additional explanation to
credit committees because of the policy of expensing rather
than capitalizing software development costs, causing higher
variation of earnings and a loss in the most recent fiscal year.

6.

Campbell has had two profit years in excess of $2 million. Ed
wards perfonnance is very marginal. Edwards would be inca
pable of repaying the loan from earnings.

7.

Edwards' loss and deficit net worth would preclude our help
ing them.

8.

If lent, both loans would have to be secured. We would need
more infonnation on the reasons for Edwards' loss.

9.

I would have to recommend declining the loan request for
both companies based on the following reasons:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

The highly speculative use of funds.
The research and development nature of operations.
The five year unamortized tenn of loan.
The unsecured status.
Declining TNW trend and increasing leverage.
Declining profit margins and loss posted by the Edwards
Corporation.
Concentration of net worth in fixed assests.

These companies . . . could possibly be serviced by asset
based lending if they would agree to loans against a fonnula
based on accounts receivable. Right now, Edwards Corpora
tion does not have the cash flow to service the debt in a single
payment sum and while Campbell Corporation does show suf
ficient cash flow, they are looking at a five year tenn before
repayment and who's to say what cash flow would be like at
the end of five years. . . ? Another option for the bank, if we
were to lend to Campbell Corporation, would be to lend
against an escrow account established with our trust depart
ment, into which amortization expense is deposited, invested
for additional income, and then used to repay our loan at the
end of the five-year tenn.
10.

Because of the $6 million unsecured line, additional unsecured
money would be hard to obtain. Edwards would only be
granted on a secured basis. Treatment would be different be
cause of the expenses, profits, capital and other ratios.
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11.

Difference in net worth, debt to worth, all profitability ratios,
ability to service, repayment requested.

12.

Trends look much better for Campbell.

13.

Campbell appears to have better liquidity than Edwards at
present and would be more able to service long term debt.

14.

Profitability and debt position of Campbell make it the much
more desirable loan. Edwards debt position makes them more
susceptible to rate risk.

15.

Management of operating costs in an expanding market ap
pears to be handled much better by Campbell than Edwards.
Generated cash flow more evident by Campbell.

16.

These credits would scare the hell out of upper management.
My bank would not consider the loan request on unsecured
terms. (This respondent would grant a loan to Campbell but
not Edwards.)

17.

Campbell is profitable and has positive cash flow to service
debt. Edwards is unprofitable, cash flow does not service cur
.rent charges, and expenses are rising faster than sales on a per
centage basis.
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Banks favoring Edwards Corporation gave the following reasons:
1.

Different methods of accounting for computer software and ed
ucational courseware construction costs.

2.

Companies are identical except that Edwards is more conserva
tive. I assume the IRS accepts both capitalization and direct
expense.

3.

Due to the nature of software industry, expensing as incurred is .
more prudent.

4.

In today's every-changing software business Edwards' policy of
charging existing software costs to operations results in a more
conservative financial presentation rather than capitalizing
them as does Campbell.

Bankers treating both companies equally cited the following
reasons:
1.

I do not make loans based only on financial statements and,
therefore, cannot definitively answer the questions. I would
weigh each statement the same in my decision but would trust
information from Edwards more than that from Campbell.

2.

Edwards uses a more conservative approach to recording the
software costs by expensing rather than capitalizing. This,
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however, is still not enough to grant Edwards the loan instead
of Campbell. Both loans are risky due to the nature of the
equipment and the uncertainty of its marketability. Neither
company in our opinion deserves unsecured credit.
3.

No difference. Different accounting for construction costs cre
ates the impression that Campbell earns a profit when the con
struction cost puts it into a loss position. Rapid growth and
expansion a mixed blessing. Would require marketable security
to both borrowers.

4.

Generally the same. Balance sheets only reflect different han
dling of software. Campbell may find more credit available due
to statement looks, thereby weakening current financial
strength.

5.

Would treat both requests the same as the only difference be
tween the two appears to be accounting treatment of software.
Not enough information to decline or approve loan. To do
properly your questionnaire takes more time than is proper to
request. This could make any results invalid.

6.

Although Campbell Corporation's financial statements might
appear more favorable at first glance, an experienced loan or
credit officer will recognize the differences in the two compa
nies' financial statements are due to the decision that (1) ac
counting treatment for Campbell Corporation and another
accounting treatment for Edwards Corporation.

7.

No difference-same basic economic facts--merely different ac
counting presentations.

One banker who did not return the survey telephoned the Na
tional Association of Accountants to say that he felt the questionnaire
was an insult to his intelligence. He stated that anyone who gave a
different response did not read the material.
QUESTION NINE:

The bank's total assets are:
TABLE SIXTEEN

More than $5 billion
$5 billion or less

A

Number of
Responses

Percentage

6
38

13.6%
86.4

44

100.0
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B

TABLE SIXTEEN

Banks having assets of
More
than $5
billion

$5 billion
or less

Bankers favoring Campbell

2

26

Bankers favoring Edwards

1

4

Bankers treating Campbell
and Edwards equally-no
reason given

2

4

Bankers treating Campbell
and Edwards equally because
accounting policy should not
affect the lending decision

1

4

6

38

QUESTION TEN

This question asked the respondent to indicate the number of
years lending experience. Half of the respondents (50.0%) had six
years experience or less. A few (4.8%) had more than 25 years lend
ing experience.
TABLE SEVENTEEN

Years Experience

o to 3
3+ to 6
6+ to 10
10+ to 15
15+ to 25
More than 25

Number of
Responses

Percentage

10
11
8
5
6
2

23.8%
26.2
19.0
11.9
14.3
4.8

42

100.0%

QUESTION ELEVEN:

Responses to this question, inquiring about the position of the
respondent, indicated that senior officers represented the smallest por
tion of the sample (6.7%), followed by non-officers (13.3%), officers
(35.6%) and assistant officers (44.4%).
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TABLE EIGHTEEN

Number of
Responses

Percentage

Senior or executive vice
president or other senior
officer

3

6.7%

Vice president, secretary
or treasurer

16

35.6

Assistant vice president or
other assistant officer

20

44.4

6
45

13.3

Not an officer

QUESTION TWELVE:

Lending officers responding to this survey were geographically lo
cated in the Northeast (22.2%), South (22.2%), North Central
(44.4%) and West (11.1 %).
TABLE NINETEEN

Number of
Responses
Northeast
South
North Central
West

10
10

20
5

Percentage
22.2%
22.2
44.4
11.1

45

V.

RESULTS OF THE FINANCIAL ANALYSTS SURVEY

In order to determine whether software accounting policy has an
effect on stock price, a questionnaire was sent to 803 financial analysts.
Two hundred ninety-seven names were purchased from the Financial
Analysts Federation and consisted of financial analysts that specialize
in the computer or software industry. The remaining 506 analysts
were chosen at random from a listing of financial analysts that are
members of the New York City chapter of the Financial Analysts Fed
eration. Forty-eight data packets were returned as undeliverable. Fif
teen usable responses were received, for a response rate of about 2
percent. Each analyst received the financial data for both Campbell
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Corporation and Edwards Corporation, a listing of ratios, a question
naire, cover letter and postpaid return envelope.
Of the fifteen usable responses received, five favored Campbell,
four favored Edwards, one had mixed feelings, and five analysts
treated Campbell and Edwards equally. The background information
needed to complete the questionnaire was as follows: 3 !
The two fictitious companies to be compared in this study are
Campbell Corporation and Edwards Corporation. The setting of
the study is as follows: Suppose you are to consult an individual
investor, named George Madison, with respect to his personal in
vestment portfolio. Mr. Madison is a vice president of a large man
ufacturing corporation and is a resident of your city. He is
acquainted with Andrew Monroe, the president of Campbell Corpo
. ration and Lyndon Adams, the president of Edwards Corporation.
Mr. Madison confronts you with an annual report for each of these
companies and asks you to compare them as jovestment alterna
tives. Mr. Madison is 32 years old, single, and in excellent health.
His salary provides more than enough income for his present needs.
He has $50,000 in cash which he desires to invest in common
stocks, preferably stocks which appear likely to have substantial
price growth over the next five to ten years.
QUESTION ONE:

If Mr. Madison wants to allocate $30,000 between these two in
vestment alternatives, what proportions would you recommend for
each common stock offering? (The percentage allocable to Campbell
and Edwards is supposed to total 100%). Three of 13 respondents
(23.1 %) would allocate more money to Campbell, five (38.5%) would
allocate more to Edwards and five (38.5%) would allocate the same
percentage to each company.

31. A similar approach was taken by Robert E. Jensen in his doctoral dissertation at
Stanford University. That study investigated relationships between security evaluation and
portfolio selection and alternative inventory valuation and depreciation methods in finan
cial reporting. See Jensen, An Experimental Design for Study ofEffects ofAccounting Vari
ations in Decision Making, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Autumn 1966 at 224.
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TABLE TWENTY

Respondent

Campbell

Edwards

1
2
3
4
5
60
7
8

0%
80
70

0%
20
30

75
100
25
25
0
0

25
75
75
100
100

50
50
50
50

50
50
50
50

9
10
11

12
13

14
15

Number of
Responses

Percentage

3
5
5

23.1%
38.5
38.5

More to Campbell
More to Edwards
Same amount to each

13
QUESTION

Two:

Given only the information provided, what value or price share would
you place on the common stock of these two companies at their
annual report dates ?32

Of the thirteen analysts responding to this question, six (46.2%)
would assign a higher price to Campbell stock than to that of Ed
wards, three (23.1 %) would assign a higher price for Edwards stock,
and four (30.8%) would assign the same price to each stock. The
mean and median price for Campbell stock were both higher than
32. The financial infonnation for Campbell Corporation for 1981-1983 is actually the
financial data for Comserv Corporation for 1980-1982. The dates were changed for pur
poses of this study to make the financials appear more current. The financials for Edwards
Corporation for 1981-1983 actually reflect what Comserv Corporation's financials for 1980
1982 would have actually appeared if Comserv had expensed all software costs as incurred.
Comserv's actual stock price for 1982 fluctuated between $11.50 and $19.75. For 1981, it
fluctuated between $9.17 and $16.00.
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those for Edwards, and the most commonly assigned price for each
stock was $10. The range between high and low price was greater for
Campbell ($30) than for Edwards ($17.50).
TABLE TWENTy-ONE

Price
Respondent
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10

Per

Campbell

Edwards

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

7.00
5.50
20.00
10.00
8.00
5.00
10.00
1.00
10.00
31.00

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$

5.00
10.00
4.00

$ 5.00
$ 10.00
$ 4.00

Share

3.00
1.50
10.00
10.00
3.00
7.50
12.00
2.50
6.00
19.00

11

12
13

14
15
Median
Median
Mode
Range

$ 9.73
$ 8.00
$ 10.00
$1.00 $31.00=$30.00

$ 7.19
$ 6.00
$ 10.00
$1.50 $19.00=$17.50

Number of
Responses

Percentage

6
3
4

46.2%
23.1
30.8

Higher price for Campbell
Higher price for Edwards
Same price for both

13

-

QUESTION THREE AND FOUR:

This question asked the respondent to rank an investment in
Campbell and Edwards stock according to risk. The majority of re
spondents rated an investment in Campbell to be either extremely
risky (35.7%) or risky (42.9%). Most analysts also considered an in
vestment in Edwards to be either extremely risky (21.4%) or risky
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(50.0%). If point values are assigned for degrees of risk, Campbell
(4.07) is found to be slightly more risky than Edwards (3.86). More
than one-third of the respondents (35.7%) rated Campbell as riskier
than Edwards, or just as risky (35.7%). A somewhat smaller group
(28.6%) thought Edwards to be the riskier investment.
TABLE TWENTY-TwO

Edwards

CamEbell
Number of
ResEonses
Extremely risky
Risky
Marginal
Safe
Extremely safe

Number of
Responses

%

5
6
2
1
0

3
7
3
1
0

35.7%
42.9
14.3
7.1

14

-

Extremely risky
Risky
Marginal
Safe
Extremely safe

21.4%
50.0
21.4
7.1

14
Number of
ResEonses

Points

Number of
Responses

5
4
3
2
1

5
6
2
1
0

25
24
6
2

3
7
3
1
0

14
-

57
-

14

Weighted Average

%

Points

4.07

Points
15
28
9
2
57

-

3.86

Number of
Responses

Percentage

Campbell is more risky

5

35.7%

Edwards is more risky

4

28.6

Both are equally risky

5

35.7

QUESTION FIVE:

Three respondents (20.0%) thought Campbell would experience
more rapid growth than Edwards over the next five years. Two ana
lysts (13.3%) thought Edwards would grow faster. An equal number
of analysts either thought the companies would experience equal
growth (33.3%%) or had no opinion (33.3%).
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TABLE TWENTY-THREE

Campbell
Edwards
Equal growth
No opinion

Number of
Responses

Percentage

3

20.0%

2
5
5
15

13.3
33.3
33.3

QUESTION SIX:

When asked to state reasons for the answers given to the first five
questions, the analysts favoring Campbell Corporation said:
1.

While Edwards sales have grown considerably, its margins indi
cate poor management, its cash flow has gone negative and it
has already borrowed more than its worth. Campbell is in bet
ter control of its expenses and has some positive trends with
decent rates of return, even though it is leveraged.

2.

While little information is given as to the state of the art of
either company, its place in the software industry and/or other
pertinent management factors, this questionnaire appears to me
to be constructed around whether I would invest in a computer
software company which either expenses or capitalizes R&D
construction costs. This has not been resolved yet by the SEC
of ADAPSO. However, based on the paucity of data presented,
I still favor Campbell Corporation for its long-term solvency as
well as leverage factors plus software.

3.

Looks like same company with different accounting (Com

serv?). Hard to assign value without knowing details of "con
struction costs"-for example, will there continue to be 30% of
revenues in next couple of years? However, the stock market
would probably value Campbell at a higher price since it is
showing 'profits'.
4.

Since an 'investment' (speculation would be more accurate)
must be made, prudence dictates that the great bulk of the
money ought to be applied to the 'safest' equity, Campbell. If
Edwards grows more, not all is lost. Earnings are better than
no earnings. In the absence of earnings, book value must suffice
as a basis for pricing; this is the basis behind Question 2 ($8 for
Campbell, $3 for Edwards). In the absence of a satisfactory as
set base, the only predicate for investment is least risk (P-E) or
pure guesswork; so much for Questions 3 and 4 (Campbell
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risky, Edwards-extremely risky). Answer to Question 5 (no
opinion) implies strongly that there is not satisfactory basis for
projection of growth.

Analysts preferring Edwards Corporation had the following
comments:
1.

Difference turns on capitalizing (Campbell) or expensing
software development and purchases (Edwards).
Write-off understates earnings initially since it ignores the in
vestment aspect. Later earnings are overstated since develop
ment costs were charged earlier.
Edwards will be worth higher PIE since no surprise write-off of
unsuccessful products and company likely more soberly view
so easier to finance growth.
Both companies are making heavy up-front software R&D in
vestments-somewhat masking a profitable business. Needs
analyses of sales and profits generated by earlier software R&D
expenditures for evaluation of both companies.

2.

Capitalization of software expense at Campbell Corporation
lowers quality of reported earnings. Any changes (short-term)
in technology could subject Campbell to write-offs. Also, debt
ratios are high given poor quality of earnings. Both companies
are small and subject to large company competition.

3.

It remains to be seen whether the cost increase incurred to buy
revenue increases in 1983 will prove profitable. That will re
quire (a) strong further revenue growth and/or (b) ability to cut
cost without impairing revenue and (c) ability to maintain ex
isting business. For each company I judge underlying earnings
may roughly be $2.50. I give Edwards a lOX multiple and
Campbell a 4X because Edwards' cost capitalization increases
risk and dampens upward earnings response if things go well.
If either software product is unique, and is going to be a barn
burner, these financials don't show it.

4.

Question 1 through 4 reflect Campbell earnings being over
stated while Edwards understated-but Wall Street pricing re
flecting current reported EPS. This questionnaire is incredibly
stupid-the development capitalization issue deserves a more
intelligent consideration by the accounting and investment
communities.

The responsed one analyst was mixed. Although 100% of invest
ment funds (Question 1) would be allocated to Edwards, Campbell's
stock ($31) is valued higher than Edwards' ($19). Campbell is consid
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ered to be an extremely risky investment, whereas an investment in
Edwards is considered safe. Campbell is expected to experience more
growth over the next five years. The following reasons were given by
this analyst for these responses:
Question 1 .(Allocate 100% to Edwards)
While Campbell appears to be growing more rapidly and has
stronger profitability ratios, its accounting is responsible for jazzing
up the numbers vis a vis Edwards. Like many companies in the
software group (CMSV, AAC) Campbell's financials are built on a
house of cards.
Question 2 (Stock Price-Campbell $31; Edwards $19)
Because investors do not discriminate regarding quality of earnings,
Campbell's record appears more solid. Thus, I have arbitrarily as
signed a value to Campbell of five times revenues which is how the
market values similar companies. I have accorded a lower valua
tion-three times revenues to Edwards. Likewise, investors using
some factor of book value to value the investment would start off on
a higher base with Campbell, whose book value would include $15
million in software plus education construction costs as assets,
whereas Edwards books none.
Questions 3 & 4 (Campbell-extremely risky; Edwards-safe)
For reasons highlighted in Question 1 and Question 2 above, I con
sider Campbell's accounting to fly in the face of conservatism,
which oftentimes catches up with companies. I feel the low quality
of its earnings impairs its suitability as an investment, especially
when one is looking out five to ten years. It could be suitable for a
short-term trader with a six month time horizon.
Question 5 (Campbell will experience more growth)
In the early stages of product development, Campbell will be defer
ring more of its costs, while Edwards will be expensing its costs.
Therefore, Campbell will appear to have more rapid earnings
growth.
General Comment:
Do not agree with Campbell's method of accounting for what it
calls "computer software and educational courseware construction
costs." Construction implies product development, not enhance
ments, and I question the suitability under F ASB No.2 in deferring
these costs.
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Some analysts treated both companies equally. Their comments
were as follows:
1.

Companies are the same except for accounting treatment of
computer software and education courseware construction
costs.
(Campbell is) Riskier than Edwards because more aggressive
accounting, but this issue is being debated-amortization and
capitalization may more clearly portray match of income vs.
expense but is more open to abuse.

2.

Obviously the two companies are the same except for the ac
counting treatment of software development cost. The account
ing treatment has little bearing on the fundamental worth of a
company. The two are of equal but low value. Both are risky,
unprofitable and unseasoned.

3.

These companies are identical as to business and their potential
growth rates. The financial statements are identical except that
Edwards writes off its courseware construction costs and
Campbell amortizes them. For most investors this is mislead
ing but for evaluation purposes both companies must be valued
using comparative accounting methods. While Edwards ac
counting is more conservative than Campbell's, both companies
should have the same stock price.

4.

Obviously the same company using different accounting rules.

5.

You are asking questions about an industry that defies analysis
on basis of accounting. As an advisor, given risk assumption of
Mr. Madison, I'd suggest buying both.

Several analysts returned the questionnaires blank, or with minor
notations. Their comments were as follows:
1.

While this questionnaire is very short, the work involved in
fully answering it will take more time than either my company
or myself is willing to invest.

2.

A quick review of the materials you sent me recently leads me
to estimate this would require about three hours of work to read
and analyze the material. I would be willing to do this but can't
justify it to my firm. They would probably want me to charge a
standard consulting fee, but since this would run around $300/
hour I doubt that this is feasible.

3.

Not enough information. Stocks are and should not be evalu
ated on financial statements alone-management, reputation,
etc., is critical.

4.

I am sorry you are asking me to give you two or three hours of
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my time-at $100 an hour that's $300 you would owe me . . . I
suggest you hire some financial analysts as consultants.
5.

You have omitted too much information to develop any reason
able values for two companies which differ only in how certain
costs are either expensed or amortized. Even with other impor
tant data, this valuation process is involved and time-consum
ing (and expensive at my rate of $120 per hour).
If you wanted to know how analysts view capitalization vs. ex
pensing, you should have designed your survey that way.
QUESTION SEVEN:

Eight of the fifteen respondents (53.3%), when asked if they con
sidered themselves to be specialists in the software industry, responded
in the affirmative.
TABLE TwENTY-FOUR

Yes

Number of
Responses

Yes
No

8
7

15
VI.

Percentage
53.3%
46.7

100.0

-

THE VIEWS OF SOFfWARE MANUFACTURING COMPANY
EXECUTIVES ON THE EFFECT OF SOFfWARE
ACCOUNTING POLICY ON BANK LENDING
DECISIONS

Material for this part was taken from a survey of software vend
ing company executives. 33
QUESTION TwELVE:

Table 25 summarizes the views of the private and public compa
nies regarding the effect of software accounting policy on the ability to
raise capital.
A slight majority of private companies disagreed with the state
ment. However, the public companies disagreed with the statement by
a margin of 4 to 1.
33. See McGee, supra note 17.
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TABLE TWENTY-FIVE 34

The inability to include software costs on the balance sheet ad
versely affects your ability to raise capital.
Number of
Responses
Private Companies
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
Firms not responding

12
17
4
4

Percentage

36.4%
51.5
12.1

37

Public Companies
Agree
Disagree
No opinion

9
37
7

17.0%
69.8
13.2

53

Public and Private Combined
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
Firms not responding

21
54
11
4

24.4%
62.8
12.8 .

90

For those respondents who agreed with the statement, some of
the reasons given were:
1.

Companies that expense software construction costs are placed
in an inferior position to those which capitalize such costs, espe
cially in start-up situations.

2.

Income producing assets need to be reflected on the balance
sheet in order to fairly present the valuation of the company. A
company would be grossly undervalued if these costs were ex
pensed immediately.

3.

Banks treat financial statements very literally.

4.

Expensing software costs adversely affects current earnings.

5.

Privately owned companies and companies that are not a sub
sidiary of a major conglomerate are at a definite disadvantage if
they expense software costs.

34.

Some of the responses included two answers.
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Those who disagreed did so for the following reasons:
1. Ability to raise capital is impacted by future revenues from
software development rather than the current balance sheet.
Expensing software construction costs actually improves future
profitability.
2.

Other indicia of financial strength and leverage (e.g., revenue
projections, business plan, etc.) are more meaningful than
software accounting policy.

3. The amounts involved are not material.
4.

The investment community offers a different multiple to compa
nies that capitalize software. Bankers tend to delete software
from the balance sheet.

5.

The ability to raise capital is a function of profit and loss and
growth experience. (But how is profit and loss affected by a
firm's software accounting policy?)

6.

The majority of assets on many vendor company balance sheets
consists of cash and receivables.

7.

The market is sophisticated enough to know the software busi
ness. Providers of capital to the software industry recognize
special situations.

8.

The cost of software on a balance sheet usually has no relation
ship to its value.
QUESTION THIRTEEN:

Table 26 shows that the vast majority of both private and public
companies do not think the interest rate they must pay on borrowed
capital is adversely affected by the inability to include software costs
on the balance sheet.
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TABLE TWENTy-SIX

The inability to include software costs on the balance sheet ad
versely affects the interest rate your company must pay to obtain
capital.
Number of
Responses

Percentage

4
24
9

10.8%
64.9
24.3

. Private Companies
Agree
Disagree
No opinion

37
Public Companies
Agree
Disagree
No opinion

5
38
8

9.8%
74.5
15.7

51
Public and Private Combined
Agree
Disagree
No opinion

9

62
17

10.2%
70.5
19.3

88

QUESTION SIXTEEN:

Table 27 shows that the vast majority of both private and public
firms do not think that expensing software construction costs ad
versely affects long-term growth. Private and public companies dis
agreed with the statement by ratios of two to one and five to one,
respectively, which is even greater than the disagreement rate for
Question 14, which asked basically the same question. On the other
hand, a substantial minority of private firms (32.4%) do think that
expensing software construction costs adversely affects long-term
growth.
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TABLE TWENTY-SEVEN

If all software development costs were expensed rather than capi
talized, your company's long-term growth would be adversely affected.
Number of
Responses
Private Companies
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
Public Companies
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
Firms not responding

Percentage

12
24
1
37

32.4%
64.9
2.7

8

16.0%
76.0
8.0

38
4
1
51

Public and Private Combined
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
Firms not responding

20
62
5
1

23.0%
71.3

5.7

88

VII.

THE VIEWS OF SOFTWARE MANUFACTURING COMPANY
EXECUTIVES ON THE EFFECT OF SOFTWARE
ACCOUNTING POLICY ON STOCK PRICE AND
GROWTH

Material for this section was taken from a survey of software
vending company executives. 3s
QUESTION FOURTEEN:

Table 28 summarizes the view of private and public companies on
the relationship of software accounting policy on investment and
growth. A small majority of private companies (51.4%) feel that in
vestment and growth would be inhibited by requiring software con
struction costs to be expensed rather than capitalized. A substantial
minority of public companies (33.3%) feel the same way. Overall, the
35.

See McGee, supra note 17.
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sample firms are about evenly divided on the issue, with 40.7 percent
agreeing, 43.0 percent disagreeing and 16.3 percent having no opinion.
TABLE TWENTY-EIGHT

If all software development costs were e:'pensed rather than capi
talized, the level of these expenditures for software companies would
have to be much lower,' companies would be forced to put a cap on in
vestment in new product programs in order to reflect good earnings per
formance to shareholders.
Number of

Responses

Percentage

18
16
1
2

51.4%
45.7

Private Companies
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
Firms not responding

2.9

37
Public Companies
Agree
Disagree
No opinion

17
21
13

33.3%
41.2
25.5

51
Public and Private Combined
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
Firms not responding

35
37
14

40.7%
43.0
16.3

2
88

QUESTION FIFTEEN

Table 29 shows that private companies are about evenly split on
the question of whether expensing software adversely affects stock
price. Public companies disagree by a two to one margin. Overall, a
majority of companies (56.8%) disagrees that expensing software ad
versely affects stock price.
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TABLE TWENTy-NINE

If all software development costs were expensed rather than capi
talized, the price ofyour company's stock. if publicly traded, would be
adversely affected.
Number of
Responses
Private Companies
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
Public Companies
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
Public and Private Combined
Agree
Disagree
No opinion

Percentage

17
18
2
37

45.9%
48.6
5.4

16
32
3
51

31.4%
62.7
5.9

33
50
5
88

37.5%
56.8

5.7

